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**Research Paper**

## **Assessing the rise of Safavid Shāh Ismā'il the I based on the theory of social deterrence**

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### **Abstract**

The theory or school of social deterrence, unlike the school of heroism, emphasizes the influence of social conditions and measures governing the economy and social product methods in the emergence and development of historical events. In its extreme form, this doctrine leads to ignoring the personalities and leaders' contributions to the events. Historians of the Safavid reign influenced by the attitude of heroism in describing Shāh Ismā'il 's character and narrating the events in his time, have highlighted his role as a supernatural savior. This attitude has influenced contemporary researchers, among which some have analyzed the events of his period focusing on his leadership. Despite this attitude, the rise of Shāh Ismā'il can be explained based on the social theory, where Shāh Ismā'il's character is subject to social conditions and the role of tribal support forces that is his leadership is of less concern. The objective here is to assess the emergence of Shāh Ismā'il the I based on social deterrence theory, in a descriptive-analytical manner. The findings indicate that the pieces of evidence revealed in historical writings, where the conditions, contexts, and previous factors in the rise of Shāh Ismā'il under his personality and leadership are of concern. Contemporary researchers have assessed this issue in its social and economic sense, or resorting to the theory of social deterrence, thus, discounting his character as a leader.

**Keywords:** Safavid, Shāh Ismā'il the I, theory of social deterrence, historians, contemporary researchers.

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## 1. Introduction

In assessing the historical events, both the influence of social and economic conditions and the contribution of prominent authorities and leaders must be of high emphasis. As to the character-centered or hero-oriented aspects of history, historical events are the fruit of the wisdom, planning, and approaches of the heroes or great men, through whom the social conditions change. This view with its ancient roots prevails among historians. Opposite this view, stand the social schools where the influence of social and economic contexts and conditions and social forces as the causation of historical events are of concern. In social theory, historical events are the result of social conditions and correlations that govern the manners where society is shaped and the correlations among social forces, the condition of which necessitate leadership and promote a social movement that would improve the provision of social stance and allow the society to change with all its challenges.

One of the historical figures in Iran who can be assessed and discussed in both the heroic theory and social deterrence contexts is Safavid Shāh Ismā'il the I. His character and governance, military operations, and the establishment of a governing dynasty at a young age have surprised the historians of the Safavid era. These characteristics have influenced even some of the contemporary researchers in this field, who consider the events of his rise and reign as the subordinates of his personality. Nevertheless, both in the descriptions of historians and the contemporary researchers, the focus has been on the previous conditions of Shah Ismail the I, and the social and economic conditions considered with his rise, where his personality is subject to these conditions is of concern: thus, a concrete example of the theory of social deterrence. The primary question here is: How is the emergence of Safavid Shāh Ismā'il the I explained in the theory of social deterrence context? The objective of this article is to assess the theory of social deterrence in history and to apply it to the personality of Safavid Shāh Ismā'il the I through the descriptions presented by the Safavid historians and scholars of Safavid studies, who considered the influence of social conditions to be the main factor in the events of his reign, and that he is not a great hero, but a product of the social conditions then. The

library method is applied in data collection and a descriptive-analytical approach is involved in the assessment.

### 1-1. Literature review

By reviewing the related literature, to date, there exists no study where the rise of Shāh Ismā'il the I and his personality are assessed subject to the social deterrence theory context. According to (Sālāri Shādi, 2018: 21), "Assessing the role of Shāh Ismā'il's contribution in the process of establishing the Safavid dynasty" was superficial; the historians, then, and contemporary researchers consider him as having a transcendent personality, leadership ability, talent, and intelligence. In the previous works, no attention is paid to the political-military decline of Iran before the Safavid dynasty and the contribution of the Qizilbāsh tribes in the establishment of the Safavid government. The same researcher, after "assessing the existing theories about the formation of the Safavid dynasty", as to Why and How its governance concerning the theory of national rule proposed by (Robert Watson, Edward Brown, Walter Hintz, Roger Savory, Hans Robert Roemer); Shiite-Sufi theory by (Michel Mazavi, Kamel Mustafa Al-Sheibi, Seyed Hossein Nasr) and Anatolian-Turkman theory by Russian and Turkey researchers: (Petrushevsky, Minorsky and Faruk Sumer), in comparing and criticizing them deduced that none of these opinions agree with the historical facts of the formation and process of Safavid governance (Sālāri Shādi, 2014, 71-102). This article can provide a first step in discussing the issue that explains the rise of Safavid Shāh Ismā'il the I through the social deterrence theory.

## 2. Theory of social deterrence

The focus of schools of social deterrence, unlike the school of heroism, is on the contribution of social and economic conditions and social production and social forces of (the strata) in the occurrence of events and even the emergence of heroes of each age and have considered it effective. The followers of this school believe that social forces, when necessary, a hero is called from the depths of human society, whose mission is to perform the heroic duties of in history. The magnitude of this so-called hero is subject to the degree of his instant awareness of what he is entrusted

with. Some philosophers believe that heroes don't need to take care of all tasks at the global level; their social needs will be met on their own. For these philosophers, only people or social strata are considered heroes (Hook, 1971: 55-56).

According to historical materialism, the structure of a society and its historical evolution are determined by the material conditions of the livelihood, that is, social existence is determined through the social products. In this theory, the economic system and social production methods and relations therein constitute the main driving force for the emergence of different forms and evolution of civilization and society. According to this theory, the economy is the main factor in the emergence of all cultural, religious, political, and military grandeur and the emergence of the social and historical life of every nation. Said otherwise, it is the economic factor that initiates, introduces, and promotes the different forms of social life, social consciousness, science, art, religion, and other spiritual values (Motahhari, 2015: 2/170-172, 180-181; Kāfi, 2013: 35-36).

In Marxism, where social deterrence is the absolute, belief, changes in the social production manner and dealing with the interests of different groups, due to these changes, are the determining factors in human history. This school does not deny the existence of great men and their historical importance, but he considers them to be the product of the social conditions from which they emerged. According to Marxism, the realm of history is subject to a "necessity" that manifests itself in a variety of events. This necessity is based on an economic necessity, which is a special manifestation of the dialectical necessity that dominates the world. The economic growth and development of a society, the driving force of which is the constant expansion of social forces, becomes advanced by the conflicts or clashes between social strata next to the restrictive social production relations or legal forms of ownership. Because history is created by humans, the obstacles on its path toward the ever-increasing expansion of social forces must be removed by the same. The greater the task and the need, the greater the man endowed with the necessary leadership to the struggle for change. The great man of action is the organizer of the inter-strata struggle who either wins or loses by the revolution. This great man

is unknown; but he will certainly be found whenever necessary (Hook, 1971: 72-73). According to Gibrion's social claims, whether an idealist or a materialist, a great man cannot influence history unless the time is in his favor (ibid: 95). Polkhānov rejects both the opinions of the defenders of the heroic interpretation of history and the theory of Gibrion's who, in opposition to this thought declares that in history personality is an eye-catching quantity (ibid: 78).

As to the question: Which is the law that prevails all associations between human beings? Marx answers: "the same common objectives that all people are trying to accomplish, that is, having enough production of means contributive in continuing their lives, and exchanges the rest". According to (Seddighi, 1983: 100), the final and decisive factor that contributes to social change lies not in human thoughts about eternal truth and social justice, but in the changes hidden in the manner of social production and exchange. Marx deduced that it is not the mental perceptions of people, but the external conditions like the wealth they possess or do not, next to their imposed activity that shape the society. The eras are not controlled by the concepts that are in people's heads, but by how their livelihood is. In general, history is not made merely by self-awareness, which evolves only as a function of increasing the population's control over their living environment (Cohen, 2007: 34). According to Marx, the important forms are not the cultures; rather, they are the economic structures. The contribution of awareness is attributed to the expanding productive force (ibid: 39-40).

To materialists, at any given time, certain feelings and thoughts are prevalent among different social strata of a society, which are the result of social correlation and are of major concern. There exists no historical event not initiated by the social economy. Every historical event is subject to a particular corresponding stage of social conscience, which immediately converts the same into a new stage. As long as there is no change in social relations, the given social spirit will not change. Provided that the development of social productive forces initiates changes in the economic structure of the society ending in noticeable changes in the mutual relations of social strata, the spirit of these strata takes a

new form, thus, a change in the social structure. These changes appear in all social grandeur (Polkhānov, n.d: 26-27).

### **3. Explaining the initial status of the Safavid era based on social theory**

According to the social theory where the emphasis is on the political and social conditions during historical developments and accredits the emergence of heroes as great personalities born of social conditions, the rise of Shah Ismail the I and his governance considered within the turbulent political and social situation. The time factor, in the sense of being favorable for the occurrence of an event, is considered by the researchers on civilization to be effective in the promotion and rise of a person or a tribe in the field of political and social life is of high essence (Le bun, 1995: 786). In the early 10th AH/16th AD, the time was right for the rise of Ismail and his political and military struggles. Taking advantage of the religious concepts of abstinence, the previous contexts of the Jihadist and Ghāziān movement of the Safavid sheiks, the fighting spirit of the disciples and the tribal excitement of the supporting Turks, the sensationalist ideology of Shia Ghāliāneh, the motivation to reach the desired state and end the time of hardship and lack of political unity marked the right time for son of the Shaikh to rise. Young Ismail took advantage of this opportunity with the support of his military. These social and economic conditions which are reflected in the reports of historians of the Safavid era while some contemporary researchers of the Safavid era have emphasized them are discussed below.

#### **3-1. Reflection of pre-Safawi Social Conditions in Historians' Reports**

Although the historians of the Safavid era, influenced by the role of character and heroes in history and social movements, attributed the emergence of the Safavid dynasty and the rise of Shah Ismail the I to his character, a supporter of Man and Allah, supported by Shia imams, had all events centered on his character, by focusing on Ismail the I's extraordinary achievements, where a sequence of the previous situation and conditions of Iran, which helped him rise is evident. These historians, as if unintentionally, admitted that a situation full of social chaos and disorder made the era susceptible to the emergence of a savior and

hero. According to the historians, at the beginning of the 10<sup>th</sup> century of the Hijri/16<sup>th</sup> AD, despite the power struggle among the Āq-Quyūnlū, which was detailed in the historical sources (Khwāndmir, 1974: 4/436-446; Qazvini, 2007: 254-261; Munshi Qazvini, 1999: 725-741; Ālam-Ārāi Shāh Ismā'il, 2005: 47-49. According to the historian Iskandar Beg, the disputes among the Turkmen sultanates reached a point, where: "so many riots and quarrels took place within them that they did not engage in any other conflict outside their tribes" (Munshi, 1998: 1/43). There was chaos in the non-Arab (Ajams) in Iraq and Azerbaijan; consequently, someone became the king in a very short time (Munshi Qazvini, 1999: 112). After the conflict between Alvand Beg and Sultan Murad in 906 AH/1527 AD., the agreement was to divide the territory among themselves, that is Azarbaijan, Arran, and Diyārbakr territories for Alvand, and Iraq, Fars, and Kerman territories for Sultan Murads (Khwāndmir, 1974: 4/346). After this division looting, oppression, and severe social demands spread in the country, the roads were blocked and fights broke out between the nobles. They captured Qāsim Beg Parnak, the ruler of Shiraz, and took him to Isfahān Castle to be killed. Abul Fatah Beg Bay'indir (Bayundūr), the ruler of Kermān, attacked Shirāz, and Ya'qūb Jan Beg, who was the ruler of Fārs on behalf of Sultan Murād, fled, and Abul Fatah Beg took over the Fārs governance, but six months later, he fell from a mountain while hunting and die, (Qazvini, 2007: 261; Munshi Qazvini, 1999: 297). According to (Munshi Qazvini, 1999: 97), "It became a strange time, neither [Alvand nor Murād] had a desire for kingship and were just spending their days... their world was disturbed and famine and plague prevailed. The result of these conflicts led to the destruction of the country. Out of this evil, and oppression, famine, cholera, and plague spread and killed many people next to starvation. The farmers and villagers were disturbed and dispersed, the people left their origins and chaos prevailed until Abul Muza ar Shāh Ismā'il Bahādur Khān, was announced the king of religion, and cast a shadow of mercy and care over the people (Qazvini, 2016: 261; Vāle Isfahāni, 2000: 740). According to another story, "because the government of Āq Quyūnlū became weak and there was chaos in the countries of Iran, the people were oppressed and looting spread and

the system derailed." As a result, Rāyāt-e Nusrat-Āyāt-e Shāhi in 1526 AD, intending to conquer the kingdoms of Iran and put out the fire of oppression and rebellion, set out (Qazvini, 2016: 271).

At the beginning of Ismail's movement, historians have listed about thirteen rulers who ruled in Iran, indicating the chaos and the lack of political integration and unity in the country. These rulers were: Farrukh-Yasār Sharvan-Shah in Sharvan, who in the battle of Giani in 906 AH/1527 AD was defeated and killed by Shah Ismail (Rūmlū, 2005: 2/954-960; Amini Heravi, 2004: 131, 132; Khwandamir, 1991: 50-60; Bazargan Venizi, 2002: 452-454; Ānjolelo, 2002: 329). Alvand Mirza Turkman in Azerbaijan, who in 907 AH/1528 AD., was defeated in the Nakhchivan and the center of his power, and Tabriz, fell into the hands of Ismail (Rūmlū, 2005: 2/974; Amini Heravi, 2004: 164-176; Khwānd amir, 1991: 63-64; Jahāngoshai Khāqān, 1985: 138). Sultān Murād in most of Iraq—A'jam, Murād Beg Bay'indir in Yazd, Ra'is Mohammad Karah in A'barqu, Husain Kiai Chalāvi in Semnan, Khār(Khwār) and Firuzkuh, Bārik Beg Pornāk in Arab-Iraq, Qasim Beg Turkman in Diyārbakr, Qāzi Mohammad and Maulana. Masoud Bidgholi in Kashan, Sultan Husain-Mirza in Khorāsān, Amir Zul-Nun in Qandahār, Badi-ul-Zaman-Mirza in Balkh and Abul-Fath Beg Bay'indir in Kerman (Rūmlū, 1599: 2/978; Munshi Qazvini, 1999: 112; Jahāngoshai Khaqan, 1985: 155-157) were the rulers.

From the expressions and descriptions that historians have said about Shāh Ismā'il the I and his justice, it is inferred that there was widespread violence and oppression in the pre-Safawi society and that Shāh Ismā'il the I promised justice to the people as a just sultan and the existing state paved the way for his rise. After leaving Lāhijan, when he reached the Gogcha-Dangiz district, he was informed that one of Mirza Jahānshāh's descendants, known as Sultan Husain Bārāni, wanted to become King and was oppressing the people, and was adding to his supporters. He promotes looting, rioting, and rebellion. Shāh Ismā'il consulted with Amra to get rid of him (Rūmlū, 2014: 2/941; Hayāti Tabrizi, 2018: 233). By appointing his agents in the cities, he assured justice for the people, freed the weak from the oppression of the Turkmen oppressors, and opened the doors of kindness and benevolence to all

(Rūmlū, 2005: 2/976; Al-Husaini, 1999: 17; Qumi, 2004: 1/73) and in a sense "restored justice" (Qazvini, 1988: 7). As to dismantling evil, insecurity and eliminate bandits and restoring peace among the people, he is named the good king, of good character, farmer-friendly, the Khosrow justice orient, Khosrow of fair judgment, etc. According to (Janābadi, 1999: 190, 192, 193, 195, 199), he spent his time establishing fairness and justice and dealing with court matters. He lived with his subjects and subordinates according to the moderation and compassion principle, and because of his majesty, no one dared to exercise encroachment and domination over the citizens (Rūmlū, 2005: 2/1133). The level of his inherent justice in politics, affection, mercy for people, and meritorious qualities, is hard to describe (Qumi, 2014: 1/7). Through his strong and right politics and bravery, the evil injustice was erased and the heads of the rebels were blown out (Hayāti Tabrizi, 2018: 12). Under his governance, the citizens were released from hardships and suffering, and ease and freedom was restored. The children of servants were freed from the abuse and aggression of corrupted authorities, the hopes and dreams flourished once again, and sedition and chaos ended (Munshi Qazvini, 1999: 121). After ascending the throne in Tabriz, he protected the residents there in the light of justice and beneficence, from the violence of the rebels (Khwāndmir, 1974: 4/468).

To him, wealth and worldly goods were valueless, and most of the time his treasury was empty of money and jewels, and whatever the governors and their agents sent to the treasury from all over the country was given to the people (Rūmlū, 2005: 2/1134; Al-Husaini, 2000: 82; Qazvini, 1988: 14).

After conquering Khurāsān in 1537 A.H., according to son historian's point of view, the king's glory brought peace and comfort to those who were caught in riots and injustice. The masses of the people, who have been saved from the flames enjoyed safety and security, and there was no oppression and misguidance (Khwāndmir, 1974: 4/516).

All these descriptions of Shāh Ismā'il's justice and respect for citizens of all strata indicate that in the society before him, chaos and injustice prevailed and pressurized people. This situation was a favorable background that assisted Ismā'il to become the Shāh Ismā'il the I

equipped with the power to save the oppressed people with his just measures.

In Khurāsān, he distributed "master of wealth" according to the customs of gratuity (Anā'm) and siyūrghal was about seven hundred tomans as gratuity, among his affiliates and freed and returned the rightful real estate and property of the Muslims, seized by the previous administrations. Because the rulers of Iraq-Ajam were not aware of the quality and lineage of the people of Khurāsān, the determination of the gratitude and their status was left to the decision of Khwāja Muzaffar Betakchi, the Minister of the Court, who acted with kindness and favored this community as much as possible (Amini, Heravey, 2013: 358). Shah Ismā'il used to say that he had come from God Almighty and the Imams to cleanse the world from the people of oppression (Ālam Ārāi Shāh Ismā'il, 2014: 201).

It is said that upon his arrival in Tabriz, next to the elders and the Turkish and Tājik people and other regions of Āzerbāijān, scholars, judges, and elders were present to greet him and congratulate his position, (Amini Heravi, 2004: 173; Rūmlū, 2005: 2/976; Al-Husaini, 2000: 16; Qumi, 2004: 1/73). The same happened in Shi'ite cities Kāshān and Qum, where Shāh Ismā'il was welcomed in the city decorated in his honor (Khwāndmir, 1974: 4/473-4; Vāle Isfahāni, 1993: 132-133), showing that the people were with him. There was no real popular resistance against Shah Ismail and the Safavid movement. Regardless of some of the resistances and stances of the elite of the society, consisting of the nobles and scholars, the vast rural and urban masses did not show any opposition to the new governance. The disastrous lifestyle of the people at the end of the Āq Quyūnlū regime, the critical situation of the rural population, the deprived classes of the society, the conflict between the khans and the local wealthy landlords, the domestic wars, the disappointment from the past governments and the hopes for the new Shi'ite slogans were the reasons for the new king to arise with the support of citizens who wished that her would free them from foreign ruling (Āghājari, 2009: 68). In a Venetian report by Giovanni Rota, in 1504 AD/910 AD we read that after the death of Ya'qūb Āq Quyūnlū, armed groups rose in the country. There was so much turmoil and

war that in less than two years, the monarchy was changed five times. During this period, the armies were constantly fighting each other. This situation paved the way for Ismail the I to rise easily because he was honored and respected to rule the country (Rota, 1508: 7). In a story Paolo Giovio, historian and bishop of the 16<sup>th</sup> century writes after Alvand killed his brother in war and arrested many of his soldiers, he become disliked by the citizens of Tabriz, and when Ismā'il Sufi entered the gates opened by the citizens, Alvand fled in fear (Giovio, 1562: 102; Ranjbar and Rahimiān, 2018: 39).

In some of his letters, Shāh Ismā'il showed his enthusiasm for the security of the country, the comfort of his worshipers, the improvement of the condition of the common people, the interests of Islam, and the order of their affairs (the letter to Sultān Selim, in Fereydun Beg, 1895: 1/413 -414; letter to Obaid Allāh Khān Ūzbek, in Khwāndmir, Nāme-e Nāmi, manuscript, leaves 13 a and 14 a). In Jovani Rota's report to the government of Venice, it is mentioned that Shāh Ismā'il that he distributed whatever was given to him to the poor. He was very serious about justice. He ordered the dealing of some of his representatives who had violated the rights of the people in difficult cities and appointed others. He could, but did not collect gold, wealth precious stones, etc. He was very generous (Rota, 1508: 6). In Andrea Corsali's letter addressed to the Florentine Medici family, similar to Rota's report, he wrote that after conquering the lands, Shāh Ismā'il distributed the booty among his companions and did not take anything for himself. He adheres to equality takes from the rich and gives to the needy. He repeated this work so much that they gave him the nickname Adel (Ramusio, 1978: 1578; Ranjbar and Rahimiān, 2018: 46). In the reports of the Venetians of this period, Ishmael was mentioned as a prophet or, due to his name, Ishmael the Prophet and the great Sufi, who sought justice and equality, shared his wealth with the common people, and with his people he was respected as a prophet (Rota, 1508: 5-6, Brummett, 1995: 334). These descriptions were very interesting for the oppressed people of Europe at that time. Italian people believed these reports that Sufi would come and save them from their misery, redistribute wealth, and give to those who have less (Floor, 1399/2020:

72; Brummett, 1995: 332).

In Khwandmir's evaluation of Shāh Ismā'il's character at the end of the events of his days, some points indicate both the situation before the Safavid era and during Shāh Ismā'il I's reign. He considered Shāh Ismā'il as a just ruler who was not irresponsive to the affairs of the country and the nation. He always had a high respect for farmers. His fair nature had become known among the people of Oxus (Jayhoun, Āmudaryā) and Tigris. The foundations of oppression and wrongdoing were destroyed to a degree that no one in the country dared to open the gates of immorality and heresy. Those who were subject to oppression in the past found refuge in the shadow of his justice, and those who were previously subjected to abuse lived in safety and saw the sight of violence impossible. His efforts were always focused on strengthening the foundations of the Islamic religion and the comfort of the Prophet's Ummah and destroying the enemies of Mustafa's religion and Sharia (Khwāndmir, 1974: 4/602).

The social conditions were not limited to internal turmoil and chaos, insecurity and injustice, as the favorable conditions for the emergence of Ismā'il the I, but the existence of human resources (tribes and clans) that supported him for his nationalization. This issue is addressed in the reports of Safavid-era historians. Some of these tribes joined Shāh Ismā'il's army due to political motivation, and enmity with Ottomans, others due to religious motivation and interest in fighting and improving living conditions. In the historical texts of the Safavid era, these tribal soldiers and supporting and devoted forces were interpreted as "Ghāzi" meaning Mujahid Fi sabil Allāh, in terms of military function in the form of holy wars and religious concepts. In the poems of Shah Ismail, these disciples are mentioned in the names of Ghāzi, Sufi, and Qizilbāsh (Safavi Khata'i, 2008: 220-221, 240, and 363). To the historians, although Ismail called his emergence a mission from the upper world (by God's order) and the infallible Shi'a imams; his Sufis, known as the old Sufis of Gilāni, who were at his service, encouraged him in this endeavor (Shirāzi, 1990: 36), indicating the contribution of disciples in motivating him to expand territories. The presence of Qizilbāsh Ghāzi forces, and Ghāzi tribal forces with the spirit of jihad, connected to the disciple-moradi

relationship that they had with the Safavid shaikhs and Ismā'il as a perfect mentor, who made many efforts and sacrifices during the Safavid movement and the beginning of Shāh Ismā'il's reign, is evident in historical texts. These Ghāzi disciples, who formed the military force of Shaikhs and then Shāh Ismā'il, and lived in different desert tribes, were attracted to him through the organization of the Safavid Tariqat, and were influenced by the thought of Ghālism (Golāt) and divinity, by the order of their Shaikhs, the Junaid, Haidar and Ismā'il was promoted to the level of God. They considered Ismā'il as an eternal being. Ismā'il was not satisfied with his belief in God according to his disciples (Khunji Isfahāni, 2012: 265, 267; Zeno, 2011: 259; Venetian merchant, 2011: 456; Ānjolelo, 2011: 344) and his campaign to Howeizeh and overthrowing Sultan Fayyāz Mosha'sha'i was their divine thought about Hazrat Ali (pbuh), moreover, they believed in Fayyaz's divinity and the abrogation of the laws of the Sharia, which "removed the evil of that irreligionist congregation by the responsibility of King Zafar qarīn (always victorious)" (Khwāndmir, 1974: 4/497).

In his first attempts at expansion, Shāh Ismā'il consulted with his commanders in the Gogcha-Dangiz region, and after paying attention to the inner world and seeking help from the spirits of the Imams of Hodā, he stated that although the expansion was a divine gift, the establishment of a monarchy and the seat of the throne is not possible without the existence of an army. It is better to send couriers and jarchiani to the surroundings and flanks in the manner of the Safavid sheikhs to encourage the lords of devotion and disciples to attack the infidels and prepare weapons for jihad. After deployment, we should focus on Gazā, and this vote was put into effect (Khwāndmir, 1974: 448-449; Amini Heravi, 2004: 84-90; Al-Husaini, 2000: 6-7; Hayāti Tabrizi, 2018: 232 - 233). These lords of devotion were disciples of Safavid sheikhs who, before the formation of the Safavid state, used to come to Iran from the Ottomān territory to visit the tomb of Sheikh Safi Al-Din Ardabili, and during the pilgrimage, they offered their vows to this tomb (Ibn Bazzaz Ardabili, 1994: 1106; Pirzādeh Zāhedī, 1964: 38). After the formation of the Safavid government, Safavid supporters came to Ardabil in the form of clans and tribes to stay

or visit the Sheikh Safi Al-Din tomb. By sending his caliphs to the Anatolian region, Shāh Ismā'il began extensive propaganda among his Turkmen disciples and encouraged them to immigrate to Iran and join him. After Ismā'il arrived in Arzinjān in 1526 A.H., which aroused happiness among his disciples in the Anatolian region as a source of Ismā'il's warriors (Sümer, 1992: 27), according to historians, seven thousand people from the disciples' clans And Sufiya from Ustājlū, Shāmlū, Rūmlū, Takkalu, Dhu'l-Qadr, Afshār, Qājār, Varsāq and Sufiya Qarāja-Dāgh, including "Mohammed Beg with two hundred descendants and subjects and Abedin Beg Shāmlū with three hundred followers" gathered around him. (Rūmlū, 2005: 2/954 Munshi Qazvini, 1999: 113-114; Qazvini, 1999: 271; Jahāngoshai Khāqān, 1985: 107). These mostly Turkish clans with a strong Shiite orientation were considered supporters of the Safavid sheikhs. Before that, Qarāja Ilyās from Baybardlu (Bayburdlū) clan left with a group of Sufis from Ottomān territory and was able to join Ismā'il (Khwāndmir, 1974: 4/452; Rūmlū, 2005: 2/945; Khwānd amir, 1991: 49; Munshi Qazvini, 1999: 113). After him, the Ustājlū clan moved to Iran. Hamza Beg Fath Oghli Ustājlū went to that tribe and conveyed good news and attracted people to the service of Ismā'il. The sage, youths, adults, and Sufis" of the whole tribe made up a thousand households. They took Ismail to their tribes similar to how the Ansār of Medina took the Prophet of Islam to Medina. Ismā'il stayed among them for several months. The people (Sufis and Shi'ites) who heard from the surroundings that the Ustājlū tribe came with this situation all encouraged and came in large numbers until they reached seven thousand people. They came from the clans to the presence of Ismā'il, their sincerity and belief was indescribable (Munshi Qazvini, 1999: 114; Shirāzi, 1990: 37; Ghaffāri Qazvini, 1990: 264).

According to Abdi Beg, in Arzinjan, "forces of Sufis and Ghāzis from the Oymāqs of Rūmlū, Shāmlū, and Dhul-Qadr began to arrive from the Batun of Rum, Syria, Egypt, and Diyārbakr" and couriers were called upon to run propaganda on Ismā'il's appearance, same as the prelude of Hazrat Sāhib-Al-Zamān's appearance. Now he was heading a military of twelve thousand soldiers (Shirāzi, 1990: 38; Janābadi, 1999: 126). A Venetian tradesman

during his stay in Tabriz (1510) observed that troops from all over the country were constantly coming under the banner of Shāh Ismā'il, especially from Anatolia, Ottoman, and Qaramān. Ismā'il gave those gifts befitting their positions. As a result, Ismā'il's power increased day by day and he gave precious gifts to the authorities who were among his supporters. In another report from a Venetian, Ismā'il won the battle with a small army against Sharvan-Shah, his fame increased so much that a great number of disciples and followers of his religious faith joined him from many regions and lands. He interpreted the reason for this enthusiasm and joining forces as they knew through their books that a new prophet would come from their sect who would promote and expand it (referring to the prophecies about Shāh Ismā'il and his attempt to promote Shi'ism, which was interpreted as he is a new prophet). This Venetian narrator then refers to the narration of the 72 sects of the Muhammadan Ummah, of which one is saved and goes to heaven and the rest fall in hell, and says that the followers of Shāh Ismā'il believe that the Safavid's religious sect (i.e., the Shi'ite religion) is the only sect that leads people to heaven. They say that Shah Ismā'il is God's agent to reveal this sect (Shi'a) to everyone and to spread it and destroy the rest of the sects. Therefore, no one in Shāh Ismā'il's army received a salary (like the Christians who went to the crusades) and from many parts of Asia, people of his faith with their wives and children left to join him provided that their rulers and leaders not prevent them, as the Ottomān king Bāyezid II did. When Bāyezid saw that the power of Shāh Ismā'il and his army was gaining momentum, and his territory was expanding, he forcibly expelled his Anatolian followers to Romania, so that they did not gather and cause problems, they were dispersed in different regions scattered far from each other like the distant border regions of Greece, Albania, Bosnia, and Serbia (See Rota, 1508: 7, Floor, 2020/1399: 79-80). In the continuation of this report, in the new information received by the narrator, many Ottoman subjects joined Sufi (Shāh Ismā'il), who shouted that Ismail was sent by God. Many people followed him and took their family with them. They believe that when they die for him, they will go to heaven, because they neither fight for government nor of fear, but only for their faith in someone (him) whom they worship.



Consequently, the Ottoman king, who was afraid of Shāh Ismā'il's power, was seeking to form a big army, thus, he imposed considerable financial pressure on the people to finance this project.

Shāh Ismā'il spread propaganda among his supporters in the Ottomān land. In 1539 A.H., upon receiving the news of the rebellion and disturbances in the Ottomān land, sent Nur Ali Caliphah Rūmlū to the Ottomān land to gather the Sufis and disciples of the Safavids and send them to Iran. With the help of the forces that joined him, Nur Ali invaded the Ottomān territory and took cities, where he preached in the name of Shāh Ismā'il (Rūmlū, 2005: 2/1068-1071; Vāle Isfahāni, 1993: 222-224; Ālam Ārāi Shāh Ismā'il, 2005: 188). With the help of these supporting forces who were ready to "use all their power and influence" (Zeno, 2006: 264) and shed their blood in the path of the perfect mentor. In a short time, "Ismā'il possessed one of the vastest lands" and became one of the most powerful kings in Asia" (Bayāt, 1959: 143).

### **3-2. Social conditions coinciding with the rise of Shāh Ismā'il the I in contemporary researchers' perspective**

Based on social theory, contemporary researchers have considered the political-social situation and religious developments before the Safavid era, especially the role of the propaganda of the Safavid sheikhs during the Tariqat and Movement period, to be effective in the victory of Shāh Ismā'il and the formation of the Safavid governance. In this theory, instead of relying on the role of the hero, the conditions and factors are of concern. In this context, many factors were involved in the victories of the leaders of Ardabil Tariqat and the spread of the Safavid movement, where: Michel Mazzaoui (1984: 160-163) emphasized the extremist religious and political factors and the connection with the ruling family of Āq Quyūnlū and the irregular and chaotic political situation in Iran. By assessing the Shi'ite movements before the Safavid era and the political situation from the fall of the Il-khanid to the rise of the Safavid Empire (more than two and a half centuries), he points out the process of converting the Safavid Tariqa into a political and extreme Shi'ite movement and then the establishment of the Safavid Kingdom where the Safavid sheikhs, Junaid and Haydar,

considered the deployment of Turkmen forces in the form of extreme Jihad to be the launching pad for Ismail to gain power and rule (ibid: 115-166, 203-207; also Al-Shaibi, 1995: 155-365; Pigolevskaia and others, 1975: 470-473).

The expert Safavid scholars have emphasized the appropriateness of the political situation (chaos and lack of unity) at the time of Ismail's movement by explaining that then, the wars on succession after the death of Sultan Ya'qūb in 1517 AD. Power had paralyzed Āq Quyūnlū. After the death of Abū Sa'id, the Timurids were not considered a powerful force in the center and west of Iran. At this time, neither the Ottomāns in the west nor the Ūzbeks in the east were in a position to interfere in the affairs of this region. In Cairo, with the end of Qayt-Bay's rule in 1522 AH, a severe crisis characterized by a rapid and intermittent change of rulers arose. Not considering a few weak local governments, Iran felt the vacuum of political power in the western region of the Lut desert (Roemer, 2010: 279). Under these circumstances, there was no stable and powerful unified government in Iran that would crush Ismā'il's military activities in its infancy or the later stages and would not allow him to appear in the political arena; on the contrary, the scattered government allowed Shāh Ismā'il to launch attacks on small rulers and annex their lands during ten years. These scattered rulers, with no coalition against him, were eliminated one after another.

In Petrushevsky's analysis based on Russian concepts, the internal situation of the Āq Quyūnlū government (ruling over Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iraq-Arab and the entire west of Iran up to the Kavir desert plain) due to the intensification of feudal dispersal and domestic wars between the emirs and khans next to the increase in the endowed lands to become state-owned led to a decrease in state revenue due to their being tax exempt. Feudal exploitation intensified and people's dissatisfaction increased. The reform efforts of Qāzi Safi Al-Din Isa Sawaji, the minister of Sultan Ya'qūb in 1517 A.H. and after him, Sultan Ahmad Aq Quyūnlū in 1524 AH, due to the strong resistance of military and clerical leaders failed. The failure of these reforms the increase of taxes and the hard pressure of the feudal lords encouraged class conflicts and increased the

discontent of the people in the territory of the Turkmen government, which was involved in feudal domestic wars and separatism thereupon (Petrushevsky, 1983: 390-391). The situation in eastern Iran, the territory of the Timurid dynasty, was not different. In this case, the sources also talk about the increase in taxes, the abuses and embezzlements of the agents and financial officials, the rebellion of the feudal lords, especially the desert feudal lords, at the end of the reign of Sultan Husain Bāiqarā (873-911A.H./1469-1506). All these factors had led to real chaos, while good for the people of Qizilbāsh who gathered under Ismā'il's command and were waiting for an opportunity to announce him the King (ibid: 391-392).

The tribal policy of post-distribution in the Turkmen government had adverse effects on the social, economic, and political conditions of the country. The desire to vote for independence strengthened the governors and nobles and made them ready for rebellion entering conflict (Hasanzādeh, 2000: 140). The multi-dimensional dominance of the tribes within the scope of their political-economic sovereignty, received from the Shah as gratitude, expanded the multi-tax system, both legal and illegal. The self-sufficiency of the economic system of each clan in its territory reduces the trade and commercial exchange momentum, and the transportation of a product from one province to another involves the payment of many taxes tariff types, and road duties. There exists no specific rule and standard except the extravagant desires of the ruler and his agents. The independent action of the landlords and owners of endowed entities, as gratitude, to financial and security affairs weakened the economic foundations of the Turkmen government. The insecurity of the roads caused by ever-increasing competition among the bandits, the chaos caused by internal conflicts, the loss of manpower, due to internal and external wars or migration and disease necessary to keep the agricultural sector afoot, and the breakdown of water canals weakened the structures of the Turkmen society due to war outbreak (ibid: 141), which disturbed the human livelihood, though provided the conditions for the emergence of Shāh Ismā'il.

This situation promoted the expectation of resurrection in the subject's minds and almost guaranteed the occurrence of a miracle; thus, the appearance of the Mahdi. When Ismail

began his movement, to some he appeared as the promised imam or at least his holy representative; these religious perceptions in the people inspired a Mahdi-like spirit in Ismā'il, and there exists pieces of evidence that the relationship between young Ismā'il and Mahdi overwhelmed (*History of Safavid Iran*, 2001: 28). Being attributed with the titles: "Khalifat al-Zamān Nāsher al-Adl wa Al-Ehsān al-Imām al-Ādel al-Kāmel al-Hādi al-Ghāzi al-Wali" (in an inscription on a stone tablet located in front of the Juma Mosque in Isfahān) (Honarfar, 1971: 87) and the just Sultan covered on his minted coins (Torābi Tabātabāi, 1971: 171-175) and the like, could have inspired the minds of Shi'ites that he is the promised Mahdi of the twelve Imams who has appeared now (Newman, 2013: 54).

Ismā'il and his followers were the exact observers of the conflicts among the members of the Āq Quyūnlū family, and the widening cleavage therein, and of course they had their spies there (Mazzaoui, 1984: 164). After the death of Hasan Beg (Uzun Hasan), the struggle of his sons and descendants for the throne led to the Āq Quyūnlū political system collapse and paved the way for the rise of the Safavids. When the rival princes of Āq Quyūnlū and the tribal supporters were engaged in fierce wars (Newman, 2013: 40) and the conflicts between them caused casualties on both sides, he gave Ismail a chance to renew his strength and made a plan with his close advisers. Their final plan was to overthrow Āq Quyūnlū in Iran (Savory, 2012: 21). In 1521 AD, Ismā'il and his advisers, the elite, deduced that this was the proper time to make the final attempt to gain power. This time package was the moment of facing the reality of the Safavid endeavor (Ibid.: 23). When Ismā'il went to Arzinjan unarmed, he established the notion that the government of Āq Quyūnlū is no more (Sümer, 1992: 26). According to (Morgan, 1994: 150), if Āq Quyūnlū had not fallen Ismā'il would have had difficulties to accomplish his plans despite his wisdom.

The emphasis of the contemporary researchers, where assessing the social conditions of Iran, then, in parallel to the rise of Shāh Ismā'il Safavi is on the role of the tribal support forces where some of them contributed to the victories and successes of Shah Ismail who was too young, thus, the dedication and sacrifice of these forces. These forces, which

were formed in the past due to the jihādīst and ghāzian attempts of the Safavid sheikhs, were now the contributive supporters of Shāh Ismā'il's military projects. The origin of most of these supporting forces was Anatolia, in the land of the Ottomāns, where many Alavids lived with strong relations with the Sufis of Ardabil from a distance time. After Ismail sent missionaries among them, these supporters joined him (Uzunçarşili, 1991: 2/257). Ismā'il's military and administrative operations were subject to the Turkmen followers' cooperation whose count was increasing rapidly. Consequently, upon conquest, the military positions and the administration of the local government were assigned to the conquered states' leaders (Roemer, 2010: 283). The Safavid government since its establishment relied on the military force of the Qizilbāshāns and Turkmen nomads who dominated a region in exchange for military service to the Shāh (Matti, 2013: 47). Qizilbāshāns worshiped Shāh Ismā'il and even raised him to the status of God. He was accepted and enjoyed popularity among the general public. The villagers and desert dwellers of Iran, Āzerbāijān, and Asia Minor anticipated the fulfillment of their long-standing dreams and hopes regarding the establishment of an era of justice and general equality from him (Petrushevsky, 1983: 383-394). The conquests of Shāh Ismā'il were the result of the bravery and sacrifices of the Qizilbāsh leaders for the sake of "master of perfection", and of course, they were compensated by the lootings of the newly conquered region. By the king's order, they established provinces and were given the Amir al-Omarā, Biglerbeigi, Khān, Sultān, and Beg Titles. They occupied the major military and administrative positions and became a formed and privileged class with limited power in Iran (Falsafi, 1990: 1/221).

The focus of Russian researchers is on the role of Qizilbāsh who paved the way for the Safavid movement followed by the formation of the government under Shāh Ismā'il; in reviewing the events, they refer to Qizilbāsh everywhere, indicating the Safavid government was founded through this Turkish element, related to the so-called Qizilbāshān movement (Pigolevskaia and others, 1975: 470-476). These researchers are against the opinion of those who considered the Safavid government evolved through the Iranian national

government, to them this government was formed due to the efforts of the Turkish nomadic tribes (ibid: 477). There exists a direct positive relation between the Safavid Sufi order and activities of Turk desert tribes, and warriors in this context. Vladimir Minorsky (1989: 238) considered these tribes to be Turkmen and the third wave of migrated Turkmen following the Qarā Quyūnlū and Āq Quyūnlū Turkmens and believes that these Turkmen tribes were the successors of the Safavid dynasty, (ibid: 19). To him, the majority of Shah Ismail's supporters were among the people of Asia Minor, Syria, and Armenia, who had formed a united front with a part of the Qarā quyūnlū and Āq Quyūnlū when the last two competed with each other (ibid: 238). Minorsky considered the Safavids as the immediate successors of the Qarā Quyūnlū and Āq Quyūnlū Turkoman dynasties with whom they had many different relations and considered the beginning of the Safavid era to be the third stage of Turkmen rule in Iran, and the military forces of Shah Ismail were completely similar to the forces of the Āq Quyūnlū, which had an Illyrian and nomadic basis (ibid.: 49-50).

Ilya Pavlovich Petrushevsky considers these tribes to be from the Turks of Oğuz, who had not yet developed into a single ethnic group, and between the 5<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> centuries of Hijri, they lived in the North West, mostly in Azerbaijan region. The religious propaganda of the Shi'a sheikhs became effective in Asia Minor, and this sect was the ideological and religious form of the opposition of the lower layers of society, that is, the villagers and the mass of desert dwellers, against the Ottomān government, in reality, in the form of political opposition. Many of the Shias of Asia Minor, especially the desert dwellers, accepted the spiritual leadership and guidance of the Safavid Shia sheikhs. Since then, these desert tribes have been the support and the main force of the Safavids (Petrushevsky, 1983: 387). To Petrushevsky the leadership in the Shi'a Qizilbāsh movement and the Safavid government, at least until the reforms of Shāh Abbās I, was assigned to the military leaders (emirs) of the desert-dwellers and Turkic-speaking Qizilbāsh tribes, the core of the Safavid armies. In the beginning, only the emirs of Qizilbāsh, together with the ghāzīs of their tribes, fought under Ismā'il's brigade. After the success of Qizilbāshān, gradually, the

majority of settled Iranian sage, the clerics (scholars, jurists, and dervishe sheikhs), and high-ranking officials of the country joined Shāh Ismā'il.

Faruk Sumer (2011:5-8), one of the contemporary Turkish researchers criticized the national theory of the Safavid government denying the Safavid family's dependence on Sadat and accepting their attribution to the Kurdish family from Sinjar, Anatolian Turks with the name Qizilbāsh in the formation of the Safavid Shiite government deduced that the objective was to spread the Shia sect in Iran. He has mentioned the activities of Sheikh Junaid and Haidar as factors of Anatolian Turks' dependence on the Safavid order and participation in military operations of their time. When the political situation was appropriate, the same Turks entered the campaign in support of Ismā'il and assured his success (ibid: 11-30). He believes that the immense zeal and dedication of Junaid and Haidar implemented the idea that could never be accomplished, possible. The idea of intervention in politics was formed in the thoughts of the sheikhs of Ardabil because of their benefit from the presence of Anatolian Qizilbāsh Turks, who were encouraged by their military power. Even based on the available sources, the Anatolian extremist Qizilbāsh Turks or a portion made many efforts to make their sheikhs or kings accept their extremist beliefs (Ibid: 31). The tolerance-seeking propaganda of the Safavid dynasty, spread on the margins of that political propaganda, during Sheikh Junaid, due to internal chaos and the absence of a powerful government, manifested itself as a new military power, a powerful support for the objectives of this dynasty during Ismā'il reign (Mujir Sheibani, 1967: 73).

English Safavid scholar Savory (1993: 32-33) believes that the Safavid cause would not have achieved political power without the sharp sword of the Qizilbāsh. The use of expressions such as Qizilbāsh territory, Qizilbāsh government, Qazlbash country, and Qizilbāsh king to describe the Safavid government, fully reveals the role of Qizilbāsh in bringing Shāh Ismā'il to power. He considers the point of view of those who think that Ismā'il is solely responsible for the victory of the Safavid revolution to be wrong because of his stunning leadership. He argues that Ismā'il was only seven years old when he fled to Gilān and when

he started his attempt to gain power from Gilān in 1526 AH. He was only twelve years old and when he ascended the throne in Tabriz in 1528 AH, he was not more than fourteen years old. The responsibility of maintaining the strength of the Safavid revolutionary movement was originally in the hands of a small group of seven advisors named the persons of commitment (Ibid: 21), who highly contributed to the successful completion of the Safavid revolution (Ibid.: 20). The special task of this group, in addition to protecting the life of their young leader, was to keep the Safavid revolutionary organization in Syria, Eastern Anatolia and several other places in full readiness and to plan for the final stages of the revolution (Savory, 2006: 193). For the first time, Minorsky, focused on the issue that "the fundamental organization of the early Safavid era was very similar to the one-party system of the totalitarian countries of the modern era" (Minorsky, 1989: 103) and the task of persons of commitment was very similar to the small group of people through whom Lenin initiated the Bolshevik movement before the revolution (Savory, 1993: 21).

According to Savory, three features: 1. the dedication of the Sufi disciples of the Safavid order to the perfect mentor Sheikh of the Tariqat, 2. the deification of the Safavid leader, and 3. the attempt to legitimize the government by accepting the Twelve imam Shi'ism, formed the "dynamic ideology of the Safavid movement" from which Shāh Ismā'il created a mixture able to force his Turkmen followers to take direct action in the field of conflicts (Savory and others, 2001: 71).

The German Shi'ite scholar, Heinz Halm, considers Ismā'il to be a great leader and mentor, who at the age of 12, in 1526 AD, under the leadership of his father's Qizilbāsh followers. Ismā'il owes his rise to power to the Qizilbāsh troops, who were gathered from the nomadic Turkmen tribes of East Asia Minor, Azerbaijan, and northern Mesopotamia. Despite their apparent adherence to Islam, they used to hide their tribal and native beliefs. By criticizing the view of Walter Hintz, who considers the national consciousness of Iranians to be the main driving force in the emergence of the Safavids, the consciousness that led to the establishment of the Iranian government, influenced by the views of Minorsky and Jean Aubin, he believes that the Safavid movement

in the first stage of its development practically had no obligation to urban or rural Iranians and Twelve Imām Shi'ism. He considers Qizilbāsh's rule as a continuation of the rule of Qarā quyūnlū and Āq quyūnlū Turkmens, a new foreign invasion that the nomadic tribes brought to Iran from the west, which had disastrous effects and was not a spontaneous national rebirth (Halm, 2010: 152). Referring to Shāh Ismā'il's military activities and choosing the ancient and Iranian title of Emperor and officially declaring Shi'ism in Iran, Halm says the self-sacrifice and fanaticism that Qizilbāsh showed ten years after the beginning of the movement brought one victory after another to the young king (Ibid: 156).

Ismā'il's assignment to the sheikhs of Ardabil, his appearance, religious faith, and his belief that he is commanded by God, corresponded in an almost idealistic way with the expectations that perhaps the suffering people had in their imaginations and religious hopes. The great influence of Ardabil Tariqat and the efforts that Junaid and Haidar had made in the matter of propaganda and military among the Turkmens, this time led to having fruitful results and these disciples found Ismā'il to be the promised Sahib al-Zamān and the Imam of Regeneration (Roemer, 2001: 280-281). They welcomed him enthusiastically and happily and gathered around him. Consequently, the disciples of the Safavid dynasty, who now had fighting and passionate soldiers, gathered around Shāh Ismā'il, dreaming of a better future under his reign.

Undoubtedly, Qizilbāsh warriors, mainly Turks from Asia Minor and Syria played a prominent role in Shāh Ismā'il's rise to power, indicating that, Qizilbāshān were not the only decisive factor in Shāh Ismā'il's victory over the opponents, while other factors affected his accession to the throne (Pārsādust, 1996: 685). Among these factors, the role of the Safavid sheikhs, Junaid and Haidar, in the foundation of the Safavid movement, Shāh Ismā'il's personality and his leadership power, the status of tribal kings in Iran, the existence of peaceful and disinterested governments is of concern. He pointed to the war of Ottomān Bāyezid II and Timurid Sultan Husain Bāiqarā in the Transoxania and Herat in Shāh Ismā'il's neighborhood and the prominent role of Iranians in accompanying the Safavid Shāh (ibid: 686-689). To him, the failed desire of

Iran, which was striving for unity and independence for hundreds of years and freedom from the tyranny of foreign rulers and their tax pressures, played a role in this victory. When Iranians felt that they could achieve their dream under the flag of a brave and militant leader who firmly thought of overthrowing foreign rulers, they stood next to the Qizilbāsh tribes and helped Shah Ismail (Ibid: 689).

According to (Newman, 2013: 56), native Iranians together with Turkish clans from the Qizilbāsh Union, which were in the political-military center of the Safavid order, and the favor of their chiefs and their troops assured the initial victories of Shāh Ismā'il. The administration of a large part of the lands that came under the control of the Safavids required the use of a different system from the Qizilbāshan tribal systems, therefore, elements of the Āq quyūnlū judiciary and native Iranian bureaucrats achieved judicial positions at the central and provincial levels. These positions indicate that the Tajiks (Iranians) cooperated in the bureaucracy by accepting the legitimacy of the Safavid government, and the Turks realized the importance of the Tajiks' cooperation (ibid: 57).

#### 4. Result

The Shāh Ismā'il's rise to power is assessed based on the theory of social deterrence and tribalism, relying on the views of historians of the Safavid era and contemporary researchers. The theory of heroism emphasizes the role of Shāh Ismā'il as a prosperous character in all events; the social theory emphasizes the influence of political-social conditions (stage of events) in the establishment of Shāh Ismā'il's government and even his becoming a leader. Next to the previous conditions, the social theory highlighted the role of the Qizilbāsh military force as the main factor in the realization of Ismā'il's goal from a dream to an objective and practical reality in the sense that if this supporting force (Tribal power) was not there, Ismā'il would be a faceless person. This theory is consistent with Ibn Khaldun's tribal excitement theory about the role of desert dwellers and tribes in changing power relations. The studies on this issue have been consciously or unconsciously influenced by one of the above-mentioned theories. Historians of the Safavid era have reported the events around the character of Shāh Ismā'il, but they also paid

attention to the favorable conditions and the role of Qizilbāsh in the rise of Shāh Ismā'il and placed it under the character of the hero of the events. Depending on their tendency towards personality-oriented or economic-political-oriented schools of thought, contemporary researchers have considered either the leadership of Shāh Ismā'il or the political-social conditions and the role of Qizilbāshān as the main factor.

Taking the extreme emphasis on both theories at par value cannot lead to a real analysis of the issue at hand. The correct theory, not influenced by the theory of heroism, merely considers Shāh Ismā'il's personality and leadership in the guise of an agent from the upper world and inspired by the unseen power and relief forces, to be effective in the formation of the government and not as the theory of social deterrence. The establishment of this government is a vital and historical destiny, the outcome of the internal contradictions of social production factors, without denying the role of Ili Qizilbāshi's force in Shāh Ismā'il's successes, or thinking that the main cause of all events is credited to the role of Shāh Ismā'il's character. Merely relying on one of these theories at the cost of ignoring other viewpoints is ignoring the influence of all effective factors that contributed to the emergence of the Safavid dynasty and Shāh Ismā'il. In a hybrid theory, the sum of all three factors (personality = hero, society=social conditions, and manpower = tribes seeking battle) must be considered in this phenomenon. Due to a set of characteristics (lineage, religion, leadership, mentorship, etc.) that gave him charisma and sophistication, the hero was able to deploy the existing Qizilbāsh Tribes (Turkish element) and the support of Iran's indigenous forces (Tājik or Iranian) and religious propaganda as the most favorable aspect to expand the country and gain power. Although the Qizilbāshān had a bond with Shah Ismail, they felt excited by the presence of Oymaq tribes within them. This excitement next to the internal-tribal solidarity made them struggle and seize power and bypass the perfect mentor and his military power in forming a dynasty. The primary core of this endeavor was the tribal concept which shaped and designed his planes with the assistance of military consultants.

The favorable social conditions that demanded some kind of change towards a

better future made him the hero of the time to carry out his task as a savior. The social conditions provided the appropriate platform for Shah Ismail, and Qizilbāsh's military force, as an effective and practical arm in military battles and struggles, which supported this movement at the formation, establishment, stabilization, and continuation phases. It seems that the situation of the time was in favor of Ismail when he sought to gain power when both the political and social conditions were fit for him to gain power by concerning the experience of his ancestors. The influence of these two, which became one of the secrets of Shah Ismail's success, made his face appear as a superhuman hero in the eyes of historians and interested researchers.

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